As the fourth round of negotiations between the US and Iran approaches, a barrage of conflicting statements, reports, and analyses continues to emerge—many riddled with inaccuracies. These stem either from a lack of understanding of technical details or from a deliberate desire to maintain ambiguity and prolong the talks.
Before this new round begins, it is crucial to clarify the current status of Iran’s nuclear program and define the steps needed to ensure the international community’s stated objective—one that all, except Iran, agree on: Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them.
US President Donald Trump has returned to office with a clear message: Iran will never possess nuclear weapons. But clarity on what that entails—and how to achieve it—is still lacking. Two main camps have emerged within his administration and Republican leadership, each with its own approach to this goal.
The first group includes Vice President JD Vance and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The second includes Secretary of State Marco Rubio—who is also serving as National Security Advisor—and senior Republican senators Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton. Former National Security Advisor Michael Waltz had been a key figure in this camp before stepping down, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appears to remain undecided.
Trump has emphasized the need for the “total dismantling” of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, particularly its enrichment activities. He has made clear he does not oppose Iran pursuing peaceful nuclear energy, provided it is strictly civilian.
By contrast, Witkoff’s public statements have been inconsistent. At times he has stressed monitoring mechanisms; at others, he has supported enrichment for civilian purposes—wrongly suggesting that 3.67% enrichment is safe. He has also voiced support for complete dismantlement, adding to the confusion.
Vice President Vance, too, initially supported limited enrichment for civilian use. But during the Munich Security Conference, he revised his stance, acknowledging that even peaceful programs must exclude enrichment capacity that could be diverted toward weapons development.
The clearest voices have come from Secretary Rubio and Senators Graham and Cotton. They have consistently argued that any agreement must result in the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to prevent military conflict. Reports on X (formerly Twitter) indicate that they are leading a bloc of Republican senators who have sent a letter to Trump, demanding that any deal with Iran eliminate its nuclear capabilities entirely.
As I warned before negotiations resumed, it was a strategic error to begin talks without first imposing strict preconditions on Iran. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a cautionary tale—an agreement that left Iran with a path to the bomb, even as it was celebrated as a diplomatic success.
Distinguishing between civilian and military nuclear programs
Now that talks are underway, it is critical to distinguish between a civilian nuclear program—such as those for electricity production—and a military one aimed at producing weapons.
Civilian nuclear programs do not require domestic uranium enrichment. Dozens of countries operate such programs using imported fuel rods. Iran’s own Bushehr reactor runs on Russian-supplied rods, which are returned after use to prevent plutonium extraction.
The US could commit to supplying Iran with fuel rods after it fully dismantles its existing nuclear infrastructure. This includes accumulated enriched uranium and centrifuge arrays. The US could even guarantee long-term fuel supply for any civilian project. But Iran has consistently refused such offers. Its claim that it cannot trust outside suppliers is a smokescreen—its true goal is to maintain enrichment capability as a stepping stone to weaponization.
Secretary Rubio has rightly pointed out that “the level of enrichment doesn’t matter—any country that can enrich to 3.67% can quickly reach 20%, 60% or 90%, which is weapons-grade.” His position is that Iran must halt all enrichment, dismantle its infrastructure and import nuclear fuel from abroad.
Any agreement must ensure the full dismantling—under US and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision—of the three core components of Iran’s military nuclear capability:
- Fissile material production
- Weaponization research and development
- Delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads
We must not repeat the error of relying on so-called “confidence-building measures,” which only buy Iran time to harden its defenses and develop new systems. Time is working against us. The UN “snapback” sanctions mechanism expires in November 2025.
Iran will likely reject any serious proposal, exposing its true aim: to gain sanctions relief and access to frozen assets while continuing to pursue its nuclear ambitions in the shadows.
Israel must be ready to act—preferably with US cooperation, but alone if necessary. Today’s strategic focus must shift from simply destroying enrichment sites like Natanz and Fordow, to eliminating Iran’s weaponization efforts and its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium. Attacking infrastructure alone, without addressing weapon development and fissile material, would be a dangerous miscalculation.
Such a strike could drive Iran’s program deeper underground and into a more advanced phase—particularly if it retains highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges. It might even prompt Tehran to seek international legitimacy by portraying itself as a victim of aggression.
Trump’s team must fully grasp the technical realities of Iran’s nuclear program. There is no doubt that Israeli officials—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Minister Ron Dermer, and National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi—understand these threats in depth and are working with their American counterparts to coordinate policy and strategy.
But ultimately, it is Trump himself who must deliver clarity. If he is serious about preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, then he must unequivocally define what that means and acknowledge that the only path forward is complete, irreversible dismantlement.
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion. He previously served as Israel’s national security adviser and acting head of the National Security Council.